The answer may depend on where the financing gap truly lies; in the construction itself or in the raw land beneath it.

There comes a point in an industry’s development when the government stops asking whether you exist and starts asking how you work. This is often when the industry discovers that being noticed by Washington is a mixed blessing.

For private lending, that moment has arrived in an unexpected form: a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study exploring whether the federal government should facilitate a secondary market for acquisition, development, and construction (AD&C) loans. This broad mandate offers private lending an opportunity to clarify its role before policies are crafted based on assumptions that may not reflect market realities.

The Missing Layer

Congress’ Joint Explanatory Statement, accompanying the 2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act, directed the GAO to assess the feasibility of establishing a government-sponsored secondary market for AD&C loans. This includes evaluating whether government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) could purchase and securitize a subset of these loans. The GAO was also tasked with investigating other federal avenues to boost AD&C capital availability, such as securitization opportunities and Federal Home Loan Bank advances.

The GAO sought to understand how the industry defines AD&C, who originates these loans, their typical structures, available data, existing sources of secondary-market liquidity, how lenders manage construction risk, necessary standardization for securitization, and whether increased liquidity would genuinely lead to more loan originations.

These foundational questions are critical for understanding a market before deciding if a federal framework is appropriate, and industry input is crucial at this stage.

AAPL recently contributed to this conversation, with several subject matter expert members participating in meetings with the GAO. During these discussions, members reported that private lenders originate approximately $25 billion to $50 billion in AD&C loans annually. Lightning Docs’ 2025 loan-level data alone identified roughly $6 billion in AD&C originations across about 6,700 loans among its platform users.

Mind the Gap

A secondary market for AD&C loans already exists. Liquidity is strongest for single-family AD&C and smaller loan balances, with current activity including rated and unrated securitizations, institutional loan purchases, insurance companies, banks, and other capital providers.

Essentially, a government-sponsored secondary market would not be walking into an empty room but rearranging the furniture while people are actively doing business. This puts another question on the table: Where does the existing market fall short?

The lion’s share of private lenders operates on the construction side of AD&C—after zoning, entitlements, utility connections, roads, drainage, and other foundational elements are in place.

The more challenging financing problem, and one of the industry’s real constraints, comes earlier, when the asset is still raw land and the borrower needs capital to create the conditions necessary for construction. Timelines are even less predictable, and the collateral offers limited protection relative to the investment. The result? Few obvious avenues for secondary-market liquidity. Land may represent one of the clearest areas where a government-sponsored program could address a genuine financing gap.

Resisting Uniformity

Regardless of where an AD&C loan sits in the development process, the underlying collateral can change materially along the way. So how much of this process can actually be standardized? Quite a bit, as demonstrated by today’s private lenders. Standard operating procedures exist for underwriting criteria, appraisal practices, and documentation. Similarly, feasibility reviews, draw procedures, and servicing practices are also moving toward greater consistency.

However, standardizing the process does not standardize the project, largely because concrete has never been especially cooperative with spreadsheets. Local permitting, contractor quality, labor markets, material availability, zoning, absorption rates, and the practical competence of the project manager are all situation-specific. This is where a federal program either becomes genuinely useful or simply another layer of bureaucracy.

If eligibility standards accurately reflect the operational expertise and underwriting characteristics required for these loans, a secondary market could broaden participation while preserving discipline. If those standards become a checklist built around what makes an AD&C loan easy to institutionalize, the program could inadvertently exclude the very borrowers it was designed to assist.

Adding Substance

The argument for additional secondary-market liquidity is intuitive: If lenders have greater certainty that qualifying loans can be financed, they can, of course, recycle capital more efficiently. This provides lenders with more room to originate, reduces pressure on their balance sheets, and could improve pricing. (This is also the part of the theory that fits neatly on a whiteboard.)

A secondary market that expands capital access without requiring every borrower to resemble a national homebuilder would be the next necessary step.

Most communities—inconveniently for standardization efforts—are not built entirely by five companies. While much of the current financing infrastructure in residential development caters to large participants, smaller developers typically operate at the community level. These developers are often responsible for infill housing, smaller subdivisions, and localized projects that are economically viable but usually lack the scale and operational sophistication preferred by institutional capital providers.

The greatest benefit to private lending may come from addressing the segments of development where private capital is most difficult to secure. If public capital were used to cover the early-stage development costs that represent the most significant impediment to financing raw land, it could expand the pool of projects that eventually enter the private construction market.

However, there are also reasons to be cautious. A government-backed market introduces the possibility that federal eligibility standards could become de facto industry standards. In the conventional market, loans conforming to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac standards have access to a deeper and more liquid secondary market, providing lenders with an economic incentive to structure originations around these standards, even if a particular loan is not ultimately sold to a GSE.

If federal financing for development came with narrow requirements regarding borrower characteristics, loan structures, property types, leverage ratios, appraisal methodologies, or development milestones, these criteria could gradually become the benchmark against which projects are evaluated.

This raises particular concern for projects most likely to fall outside standardized underwriting. For example, raw-land development is precisely where individualized risk assessment can be most crucial. A parcel may have little value under its current zoning but be economically viable with construction that meets a local need. A borrower may have a strong development record without fitting a standardized credit profile. A project may be perfectly sound economically but require a capital structure or timeline that doesn’t fit a standardized federal product. If federal eligibility rules become the market’s reference point, such projects could remain difficult to finance unless private lenders are willing to retain loans that the broader market perceives as unusually risky, even when actual underwriting suggests otherwise.

Before Policy Hardens

Major shifts in financial-market infrastructure usually require a catalyst; the 2007–2009 financial crisis is a clear example, leading to interventions that would have been politically challenging under normal market conditions.

The current situation differs. While there is indeed a housing shortage, with persistent affordability pressures, elevated construction costs, and an unusually broad—by Washington standards—political consensus that the country needs more housing, there isn’t a pivotal event forcing Congress to create a federal secondary market. Gaining agreement that more housing is needed is considerably easier than securing votes on how, where, and by whom it should be financed.

Concurrently, Washington is advocating for more housing and suggesting limitations on certain forms of institutional participation in housing. Witness The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, enacted in July with overwhelming bipartisan support. Among its provisions are measures aimed at reducing barriers to housing construction, while also restricting large institutional investors from acquiring additional single-family homes beyond a statutory threshold of 350 properties.

In this political climate, private real estate lending can become collateral damage because policymakers, media, and the public frequently group private lending, private equity, and institutional investment into the broad category of “Wall Street.” The GAO study offers the industry a chance to differentiate itself before policy is built on flawed assumptions.

A federal secondary-market structure would also entail a long list of decisions, particularly concerning risk retention, servicing, securitization, capital requirements, government guarantees, GSE authorities, and taxpayer exposure.

Should we expect an AD&C secondary market to materialize in the next legislative session? Hardly. More likely, we are looking at a study, recommendations, further stakeholder engagement, perhaps a pilot program, and eventually some form of legislative or regulatory action—but only if political momentum is sustained. AAPL’s Magic 8-Ball, perhaps the most reliable forecasting tool available, says, “Don’t count on it.”

Better Sightlines

For AAPL, advocacy in this context is less about lobbying for a government-backed secondary market or seeking special treatment for private lenders. Our focus is ensuring that the individuals designing policy genuinely understand the market they are about to influence.

This means explaining that AD&C is not a monolithic product, and sharing why a $4 million single-family construction loan has an entirely different liquidity profile than a much larger multifamily development loan. It means explaining why a lender’s construction-management capabilities are as consequential as the borrower’s and project’s financial characteristics.

And it also means being forthright about the industry’s weaknesses. There is no unified loan-level dataset for private lending. Policymakers are encountering a market assembled from fragmented information on originations, collateral, valuation, construction economics, and securitization. This makes it harder to grasp the industry’s actual scale and performance—and policymakers cannot evaluate a market they cannot see.

AAPL can help make that market visible. During this engagement, the association identified data providers, ratings agencies, originators, securitization participants, capital markets firms, and secondary-market purchasers who could contribute diverse perspectives.

The eventual outcome could be a federal secondary market, a pilot program, a set of recommendations Congress debates for years, or nothing at all. What is predictable is that the questions will continue, and private lenders should not wait until legislation is drafted to explain their business model. Engaging while policymakers are still defining the problem gives AAPL a chance to challenge assumptions before they become policy, connect researchers with